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A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space
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1. Introduction
The objective of mechanism design is to construct mechanisms (or game forms) such that privately informed agents
have an incentive to reveal their information to a principal who seeks to realize a social choice function. The revelation
principle establishes that if any mechanism can induce the agents to report their information, then the agents will also have
an incentive to report truthfully in the direct mechanism. Given the beliefs of the agents, the truthtelling constraints then
reduce in the direct mechanism to the Bayesian incentive compatibility conditions.
There are two important limitations of Bayesian incentive compatibility analysis. First, the analysis typically assumes a
commonly known common prior over the agents’ types. This assumption may be too stringent in practise. In the spirit of
the “Wilson doctrine” (Wilson, 1987), we would like implementation results that are robust to different assumptions about
what agents do or do not know about other agents’ types. Second, the revelation principle only establishes that the direct
mechanism has an equilibrium that achieves the social choice function. In general, there may be other interim (or Bayesian)
equilibria that deliver undesirable outcomes.1 We would like to achieve full implementation, i.e., show the existence of a
mechanism all of whose interim equilibria deliver the social choice function. We studied the ﬁrst “robustness” problem
in an earlier work, Bergemann and Morris (2005). The second “full implementation” problem has been the subject of a
✩ This research is supported by NSF Grants #CNS-0428422 and #SES-0518929. We thank Matthew Jackson, the co-editor, Andrew Postlewaite and two
anonymous referees for helpful comments. This paper supersedes and incorporates results reported earlier in Bergemann and Morris (2005). Through our
joint authorship of Bergemann et al. (2010) and detailed comments on this draft, Olivier Tercieux has greatly improved this version, including suggesting a
strengthening of Theorem 1 and the treatment of responsive social choice functions in Section 6.1.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: dirk.bergemann@yale.edu (D. Bergemann), smorris@princeton.edu (S. Morris).
1 We typically refer to “interim” equilibria rather than “Bayesian” equilibria in light of the fact that the type space may not have a common prior.
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large literature. In the incomplete information context, key full implementation references are Postlewaite and Schmeidler
(1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) and Jackson (1991). In this paper, we study “robust implementation” where we require
robustness and full implementation simultaneously.
The notion of robust implementation requires that a social choice function f can be interim implemented for all type
spaces T . As we look for necessary and suﬃcient conditions for robust implementation, conceptually there are (at least)
two approaches to obtain the conditions. One approach would be to simply look at the interim implementation conditions
for every possible type space T and then try to characterize the intersection or union of these conditions for all type
spaces. This is the approach we initially pursued, and it works in a brute force kind of way. In Section 6.3, we review
what happens under this approach. But we focus our analysis on a second, more elegant, approach. We ﬁrst establish an
equivalence between robust and rationalizable implementation and then derive the conditions for robust implementation as
an implication of rationalizable implementation. The advantage of the second approach is that after establishing the equiv-
alence, we do not need to argue in terms of large type spaces, but rather derive the results from a novel argument using
the iterative deletion procedure associated with rationalizability. For rationalizable implementation, we ﬁx a mechanism and
iteratively delete messages for each payoff type that are strictly dominated by another message for each payoff type proﬁle
and message proﬁle that has survived the procedure.2 The equivalence between robust and rationalizable implementation
illustrates a general point well-known from the literature on epistemic foundations of game theory (e.g., Brandenburger and
Dekel (1987), Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003)): equilibrium solution concepts only have bite if we make strong assumptions
about type spaces, i.e., we assume small type spaces where the common prior assumption holds.
We exploit the equivalence between robust and rationalizable implementation to obtain necessary and suﬃcient con-
ditions for robust implementation in general environments. Our necessity argument is conceptually novel, exploiting the
iterative characterization. The necessary conditions for robust implementation are ex post incentive compatibility of the
social choice function and a condition – robust monotonicity – that is equivalent to requiring Bayesian monotonicity on ev-
ery type space. This condition is strong and implies Maskin monotonicity – necessary and almost suﬃcient for complete
information implementation – but is strictly weaker than dominant strategy implementation.
The suﬃciency argument requires only a modest strengthening of the necessary condition by guaranteeing that the
preference proﬁle of each agent satisﬁes a (conditional) no total indifference property. Under this no total indifference
property, we show that the necessary conditions are also suﬃcient for robust implementation. The suﬃcient conditions
guarantee robust implementation in pure, but also in mixed strategies. Our robust analysis thus removes the frequent gap
between pure and mixed strategy implementation in the literature.
In this paper, we follow the classic implementation literature in allowing for arbitrary mechanisms, including modulo and
integer games. By allowing for these mechanisms, we are able to make tight connections with the existing implementation
literature. Allowing for these badly behaved mechanisms does complicate our analysis: for example, we must allow for
transﬁnite iterated deletion of best responses in our deﬁnition of rationalizable implementation. Given the complications
arising from inﬁnite mechanisms, we report new necessary conditions for robust implementation in the context of ﬁnite
mechanisms. We also report how our earlier research can be used to show that these necessary conditions are suﬃcient
conditions for ﬁnite mechanisms either in well-behaved, but restricted, environments (Bergemann and Morris, 2009a) or
under a virtual rather than exact implementation requirement (Bergemann and Morris, 2009b).
Our results extend the classic literature on Bayesian implementation due to Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey
and Srivastava (1989) and Jackson (1991). We focus in this paper on an indirect approach to extending these results. We ﬁrst
note the equivalence between robust implementation and rationalizable implementation. We then exploit the equivalence to
report a direct argument showing that robust monotonicity is a necessary and almost suﬃcient condition for rationalizable
implementation. But in the light of the classic literature, we know that a necessary and almost suﬃcient condition for
robust implementation must be Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces. We conﬁrm and clarify our results by directly
checking that robust monotonicity is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces. Fig. 1 gives a stylized account
of the connection between these alternative approaches.
In the implementation literature, it is a standard practice to obtain the suﬃciency results with augmented mechanisms.
By augmenting the direct mechanism with additional messages, the designer may elicit additional information about unde-
sirable equilibrium play by the agents. Yet, in many applied economic settings, single crossing or supermodular preference
assumptions allow direct implementation. In a companion paper, Bergemann and Morris (2009a), we provide necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for robust implementation in the direct mechanism. The main results there apply to environments
where each agent’s type proﬁle can be aggregated into a one-dimensional suﬃcient statistic and where preferences are
single crossing with respect to that statistic. These restrictions incorporate many economic models with interdependence in
the literature. We show that besides an incentive compatibility condition, in this case the strict ex post incentive compati-
bility condition, a contraction property which requires that there is not too much interdependence in agents’ types, together
present necessary and suﬃcient conditions for robust implementation in the direct mechanism.
The robust monotonicity condition is stronger than both the Maskin and the Bayesian monotonicity conditions. In the
context of robust implementation, we can ask whether a relaxation from the exact to the virtual implementation condition
2 We use rationalizability (and rationalizable implementation) in this paper to refer to the “robust” version of the solution concept where payoff types
are not known but any beliefs about others’ payoff types are considered. We will later discuss the relation to implementation in rationalizable strategies in
complete information settings (Bergemann et al., 2010) and interim versions of rationalizability (Dekel et al., 2007).D. Bergemann, S. Morris / Games and Economic Behavior 71 (2011) 261–281 263
Fig. 1. Relationship between Bayesian and robust implementation/monotonicity.
may lead to more permissive results. In Bergemann and Morris (2009b) we characterize the necessary and suﬃcient condi-
tions for robust virtual implementation. There we show that a social choice function can be robustly virtually implemented if
and only if the social choice function is ex post incentive compatible and robust measurable. We establish here that robust
measurability remains a necessary condition for robust (exact) implementation, but it is not suﬃcient anymore.
The results in this paper concern full implementation. An earlier paper of ours, Bergemann and Morris (2005), addresses
the analogous questions of robustness to rich type spaces, but looking at the question of partial implementation, i.e., does
there exist a mechanism such that some equilibrium implements the social choice function. We showed that ex post (par-
tial) implementation of the social choice function is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for partial implementation on all
type spaces.3 This paper establishes that an analogous result does not hold for full implementation. In a related paper,
Bergemann and Morris (2008a), we therefore investigate the notion of ex post implementation. The necessary and suﬃcient
conditions there straddle the implementation conditions for Nash and Bayesian–Nash respectively, as an ex post equilibrium
is a Nash equilibrium at every incomplete information (Bayesian) type proﬁle. However in contrast to the iterative argument
pursued here, the basic reasoning in Bergemann and Morris (2008a) invokes more traditional equilibrium arguments. By
comparing the conditions for ex post and robust implementation, it becomes apparent that robust implementation typically
imposes additional constraints on the allocation problem. In Bergemann and Morris (2008a), we showed that in single cross-
ing environments, the same single crossing conditions which guarantee incentive compatibility also guarantee full ex post
implementation. In contrast, in the aggregation environment discussed above, we show that robust implementation imposes
a strict bound on the interdependence of the preferences, which is not required by the truthtelling conditions. A contraction
mapping behind the iterative argument directly points to the source of the restriction of the interaction term.
Our results provide a characterization of rationalizable implementation in incomplete information environments. In a
recent work, Bergemann et al. (2010), we have adapted the arguments to characterize rationalizable implementation in
complete information environments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the formal environment and solution concepts.
Section 3 gives necessary and suﬃcient conditions for rationalizable implementation. Section 4 establishes an (almost)
equivalence relation between rationalizable and robust implementation and then reports the necessary and suﬃcient condi-
tions for robust implementation. Section 5 establishes necessary conditions for robust implementation in ﬁnite mechanisms.
Section 6 discusses extensions and variations of our implementation results, examining the role of lotteries and pure
strategies and the relationship with Nash equilibrium and ex post equilibrium implementation. Appendix A contains some
additional examples.
2. Setup
2.1. The payoff environment
We consider a ﬁnite set of agents, 1,2,...,I.A g e n ti’s payoff type is θi ∈ Θi.W ew r i t eθ ∈ Θ = Θ1 ×···×ΘI.T h e r e
is a set of outcomes Z. We assume that each Θi and Z are countable.4 Each individual has a von Neumann–Morgenstern
utility function ui : Z × Θ → R. Thus we are in the world of interdependent types, where an agent’s utility depends on
other agents’ payoff types. We allow for lotteries over deterministic outcomes.5 Let Y   (Z) and extend ui to the domain
Y ×Θ in the usual way:
ui(y,θ)
 
z∈Z
y(z)ui(z,θ).
3 This result does not extend to social choice correspondences.
4 The countable types restriction clariﬁes the relation to the existing literature. We brieﬂy discuss what happens if we allow for uncountable payoff types,
types and pure outcomes in Section 6.5.
5 The role of the lottery assumption and what happens when we drop it are discussed in Section 6.3.264 D. Bergemann, S. Morris / Games and Economic Behavior 71 (2011) 261–281
A social choice function is a mapping f : Θ → Y. If the true payoff type proﬁle is θ, the planner would like the outcome to
be f(θ). In this paper, we restrict our analysis to the implementation of a social choice function rather than a social choice
correspondence or social choice set.6
2.2. Type spaces
We are interested in analyzing behavior in a variety of type spaces, many of them with a richer set of types than payoff
types. For this purpose, we shall refer to agent i’s type as ti ∈ Ti, where Ti is a countable set. A type of agent i must include
a description of his payoff type. Thus there is a function   θi : Ti → Θi with   θi(ti) being agent i’s payoff type when his type
is ti.At y p eo fa g e n ti must also include a description of his beliefs about the types of the other agents; thus there is a
function   πi : Ti →  (T−i) with   πi(ti) being agent i’s belief type when his type is ti.T h u s  πi(ti)[t−i] is the probability that
type ti of agent i assigns to other agents having types t−i.Atype space is a collection:
T = (Ti,  θi,  πi)
I
i=1.
We assume throughout that the function   θi : Ti → Θi is surjective, and hence that the type space is at least as large as the
payoff type space.
2.3. Mechanisms
A planner must choose a game form or mechanism for the agents to play in order to determine the social outcome.
Let Mi be the countably inﬁnite set of messages available to agent i.W ed e n o t et h eg e n e r i cm e s s a g eb ymi ∈ Mi and let
m ∈ M = M1 ×···×MI.L e tg(m) be the distribution over outcomes if action proﬁle m is chosen. Thus a mechanism is a
collection M = (M1,...,MI, g(·)), where g : M → Y.
2.4. Solution concepts
Now holding ﬁxed the payoff environment, we can combine a type space T with a mechanism M to get an incomplete
information game (T ,M). The payoff of agent i if message proﬁle m is chosen and type proﬁle t is realized is then given
by
ui
 
g(m),  θ(t)
 
.
A pure strategy for agent i in the incomplete information game (T ,M) is given by
si : Ti → Mi.
A (behavioral) strategy is given by
σi : Ti →  (Mi).
The objective of this paper is to obtain implementation results for interim, or Bayesian Nash, equilibria on all possible
types spaces. The notion of interim equilibrium for a given type space T is deﬁned in the usual way.
Deﬁnition 1 (Interim equilibrium). As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁ l eσ = (σ1,...,σI) is an interim equilibrium of the game (T ,M) if, for all
i, ti and mi with σi(mi|ti)>0,
 
t−i∈T−i
 
m−i∈M−i
  
j =i
σj(mj|t j)
 
ui
 
g(mi,m−i),  θ(t)
 
  πi(ti)[t−i]

 
t−i∈T−i
 
m−i∈M−i
  
j =i
σj(mj|t j)
 
ui
 
g
 
m 
i,m−i
 
,  θ(t)
 
  πi(ti)[t−i], ∀m 
i.
Requiring “robust” implementation, i.e., for “all type spaces”, will push the solution concept in the direction of rational-
izability. Consequently, we deﬁne a message correspondence proﬁle S = (S1,...,SI), where each
Si : Θi → 2
Mi, (1)
6 One reason why the extension to social choice correspondences is not straightforward is that, with social choice correspondences, the incentive com-
patibility conditions that arise from requiring partial implementation are typically weaker than ex post incentive compatibility, as shown by examples in
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and we write S for the collection of message correspondence proﬁles. The collection S is a lattice with the natural ordering
of set inclusion: S  S  if Si(θi) ⊆ S 
i(θi) for all i and θi. The largest element is S = (S1,...,SI), where Si(θi) = Mi for all i
and θi. The smallest element is S = (S1,...,SI), where Si(θi) = ∅ for all i and θi.
We deﬁne an operator b = (b1,...,bI) to iteratively eliminate never best responses. To this end, we denote the belief of
agent i over message and payoff type proﬁles of the remaining agents by
λi ∈  (M−i ×Θ−i).
The operator b : S → S is now deﬁned as:
bi(S)[θi] 
⎧
⎨
⎩
mi ∈ Mi
   
 
   
 
∃λi s.th.:
(1)λ i(m−i,θ−i)>0 ⇒ mj ∈ S j(θj) for all j  = i;
(2)
 
m−i,θ−i λi(m−i,θ−i)ui(g(mi,m−i),(θi,θ−i))

 
m−i,θ−i λi(m−i,θ−i)ui(g(m 
i,m−i),(θi,θ−i)), ∀m 
i ∈ Mi;
⎫
⎬
⎭
.
We observe that b is increasing by deﬁnition: i.e., S  S  ⇒ b(S)  b(S ). By Tarski’s ﬁxed point theorem, there is a
largest ﬁxed point of b, which we label SM. Thus (i) b(SM) = SM and (ii) b(S) = S ⇒ S  SM. We can also construct
the ﬁxed point SM by starting with S – the largest element of the lattice – and iteratively applying the operator b.I ft h e
message sets and types are ﬁnite, we have
SM
i (θi) 
 
n1
bi
 
b
n(S)
 
[θi].
But because the mechanism M may be inﬁnite, transﬁnite induction may be necessary to reach the ﬁxed point.7 It is useful
to deﬁne
S
M,k
i (θi)  bi
 
b
k−1(S)
 
[θi],
again using transﬁnite induction if necessary. Thus SM
i (θi) are the set of messages surviving (transﬁnite) iterated deletion
of never best responses; equivalently, SM
i (θi) is the set of messages that a player with payoff type θi might send consistent
with common certainty of rationality, but no restrictions on higher order beliefs about others’ types. We refer to SM
i (θi) as
the rationalizable messages of type θi of agent i in mechanism M.
If message sets are ﬁnite (or compact), a well-known duality argument implies that never best responses are equivalent
to strictly dominated actions. However, the equivalence does not hold with inﬁnite (non-compact) message sets.8 In a
compact message analysis, Chung and Ely (2001) consider a version of this solution concept in an incomplete information
mechanism design context with dominated (not strictly dominated) messages deleted at each round. The solution concept
deﬁned through the iterative application of the operator b is weaker than the notion of interim rationalizability for a given
type space T , as deﬁned by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) and Dekel et al. (2007). Under b,e v e r ya g e n ti is allowed to
hold arbitrary beliefs about Θ−i and is not restricted to a particular posterior distribution over Θ−i. On the other hand,
i ft h et y p es p a c eT were the universal type space, then SM
i (θi) would be equal to the union of all interim rationalizable
a c t i o n so fa g e n ti over all types ti ∈ Ti whose payoff type proﬁle coincides with θi,o r  θi(ti) = θi.
2.5. Implementation
We now deﬁne the notions of interim, robust and rationalizable implementation.
Deﬁnition 2 (Interim implementation). Social choice function f is interim implemented on type space T by mechanism M
if the game (T ,M) has an equilibrium and every equilibrium σ of the game (T ,M) satisﬁes
σ(m|t)>0 ⇒ g(m) = f
 
  θ(t)
 
.
A tradition in the implementation literature commonly restricts attention to pure strategy equilibria, but we allow mixed
strategy equilibria.
7 Lipman (1994) contains a formal description of the transﬁnite induction required (for the case of complete information, but nothing important changes
with incomplete information). As he notes “we remove strategies which are never a best reply, taking limits where needed”.
8 The following example, suggested to us by Andrew Postlewaite, illustrates the non-equivalence. Players 1 and 2 each choose a non-negative integer, k1
and k2 respectively. The payoff to player 1 from k1 = 0 is 1. The payoff to player 1 from action k1  1i s2i fk1 > k2, 0 otherwise. For any belief that player
1 has about 2’s actions, there is a (suﬃciently high) action from player 1 that gives him a payoff greater than 1. Thus action 0 is never a best response for
player 1. However, for any mixed strategy of player 1, there is a (suﬃciently high) action of player 2 such that action 0 is a better response for player 1
than the mixed strategy. Thus action 0 is not strictly dominated.266 D. Bergemann, S. Morris / Games and Economic Behavior 71 (2011) 261–281
Deﬁnition 3 (Robust implementation). Social choice function f is robustly implemented by mechanism M if, for every T ,
f is interim implemented on type space T by mechanism M. Social choice function f is robustly implementable if there
exists a mechanism M such that f is robustly implemented by mechanism M.
The notion of robust implementation requires that we can ﬁnd a mechanism M which implements f for every type
space T . A weaker requirement would be to ask that for every type space T there exists a, possibly different, mechanism
M such that f is implemented. This weaker notion would still lead to the same necessary condition as the stronger
implementation version we pursue here, and we believe that it would not lead to a change in the suﬃciency conditions
either.
Deﬁnition 4 (Rationalizable implementation). Social choice function f is rationalizably implementable by mechanism M if
1. m ∈ SM(θ) ⇒ g(m) = f(θ); and
2. For each i and ψi ∈  (Θ−i),t h e r ee x i s t sλi ∈  (M−i ×Θ−i) such that:
(a) λi(m−i,θ−i)>0 ⇒ mj ∈ SM
j (θj) for all j  = i,
(b)
 
m−i λi(m−i,θ−i) = ψi(θ−i) for all θ−i ∈ Θ−i,
(c) argmaxmi
 
m−i,θ−i λi(m−i,θ−i)ui(g(mi,m−i),(θi,θ−i))  = ∅ for all θi ∈ Θi.
Social choice function f is rationalizably implementable if there exists a mechanism M such that f is rationalizably imple-
mentable by M.
Part (1) of the deﬁnition requires that every rationalizable message proﬁle leads to an outcome consistent with the social
choice function. Part (2) requires that rationalizable messages exist. The existence of rationalizable message is automatically
guaranteed if M is ﬁnite. In inﬁnite mechanism, the existence requirement is strong: we require that for each belief that
agent i may have over the payoff types of the other agents, there exists a belief over the rationalizable messages that other
agents might send such that agent i has a best response, whatever his payoff type. Following Theorem 1, we will report
why our proof would not go through, in general, under weaker versions of this requirement; but in Section 6.1, we report
how the best response property could be weakened in the special case where the social choice function is responsive,s o
that distinct payoff types of an agent always lead to distinct outcomes under the social choice function, for at least one
payoff type proﬁle of the other agents.
Note that if a best response exists for agent i to a conjecture over rationalizable messages, as in part (c), then by part (1),
every rationalizable action of agent i will be a best response. Thus we could strengthen property (c) in the deﬁnition of
rationalizable implementation to
(c’) argmaxmi
 
m−i,θ−i λi(m−i,θ−i)ui(g(mi,m−i),(θi,θ−i)) = SM
i (θi)  = ∅ for all θi ∈ Θi,
without strengthening the deﬁnition.
3. Rationalizable implementation
3.1. Necessity
The following ex post incentive compatibility condition is a necessary condition for robust truthful (or partial) imple-
mentation as established in Bergemann and Morris (2005).
Deﬁnition 5 (EPIC). Social choice function f satisﬁes ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) if
ui
 
f (θi,θ−i),(θi,θ−i)
 
 ui
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ−i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
,
for all i, θi, θ 
i and θ−i.
But a strengthening of this condition will be necessary for robust full implementation.
Deﬁnition 6 (Semi-strict EPIC). Social choice function f satisﬁes semi-strict ex post incentive compatibility (semi-strict EPIC) if,
for each i, θi, θ 
i:
ui
 
f (θi,θ−i),(θi,θ−i)
 
> ui
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ−i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
, ∀θ−i,
if there exists θ 
−i ∈ Θ−i such that f(θi,θ 
−i)  = f(θ 
i,θ 
−i).D. Bergemann, S. Morris / Games and Economic Behavior 71 (2011) 261–281 267
Next we present the monotonicity conditions which are at the core of the robust implementation results. It is useful to
ﬁrst think about agents playing the direct mechanism, where each agent i reports his payoff type. An agent i may or may
not report truthfully. A deception is a set-valued proﬁle β = (β1,...,βI), where
βi : Θi → 2Θi/∅,
with θi ∈ βi(θi) for all i and all θi.Ad e c e p t i o no fa g e n ti with payoff type θi is a set of possible reports by agent i.T h u sa
deception of payoff type θi includes, but is not restricted to, θi itself.
Deﬁnition 7 (Acceptable/unacceptable deception). A deception β is acceptable if θ  ∈ β(θ) ⇒ f(θ ) = f(θ).Ad e c e p t i o ni s
unacceptable if it is not acceptable.
In this language, the truthtelling “deception”, deﬁned by β∗
i (θi)  θi for all θi is an acceptable deception. Other deceptions
of agent i may also be acceptable if the social choice function does not vary with respect to some subset of reports of agent
i for all type proﬁles of the other agents. The inverse mapping of a deception βi represents the set of true type proﬁles θi
which could lead to a report θ 
i and we write
β−1
i
 
θ 
i
 

 
θi | θ 
i ∈ βi(θi)
 
.
A “robust monotonicity” condition is key to our main result. If a deception is “unacceptable,” it must be possible to “refute”
it. In the direct mechanism, where agents other than i report themselves to be types θ−i,a g e n ti can obtain outcomes
f(θ 
i,θ−i) for any θ 
i. But once we allow augmented mechanisms, we can offer agent i a larger set of lotteries if he reports
deviant behavior of his opponents. We need to identify, for any given report proﬁle θ−i, the set of lotteries with the
property that whatever agent i’s actual type, he would never prefer such an allocation to what he would obtain under the
social choice function if other agents were reporting truthfully. Thus:
Yi(θ−i) 
 
y ∈ Y | ui
 
y,
 
θ  
i ,θ−i
  
 ui
 
f
 
θ  
i ,θ−i
 
,
 
θ  
i ,θ−i
  
for all θ  
i ∈ Θi
 
. (2)
Henceforth, we refer to the set Yi(θ−i) as the reward set (for agent i).
Suppose now that there was common certainty that in the direct mechanism, type θi of agent i will send a report
θ 
i ∈ βi(θi).B u ti fβ is not acceptable, we must ﬁnd a type of some agent who is prepared to report that other agents
are misreporting. But for the “whistle-blower” who is going to report that we are in a bad equilibrium, we cannot know
what he believes about the types of the other agents, nor can we know what message he expects to hear except that it
is a message consistent with the deception. We thus have to allow for all possible beliefs ψi of agent i over payoff types
θ−i ∈ Θ−i consistent with a report θ 
−i from a given deception proﬁle β,o r
ψi ∈  
 
β−1
−i
 
θ 
−i
  
.
Finally, the reward that he is offered must not interfere with the truth-telling behavior in the good equilibrium, i.e., it must
belong to the reward set corresponding to report θ 
−i.
Deﬁnition 8 (Refutable deception). A deception β is refutable if there exist i, θi, θ 
i ∈ βi(θi) such that, for all θ 
−i ∈ Θ−i and
ψi ∈  (β−1
−i (θ 
−i)),t h e r ee x i s t sy such that:
 
θ−i∈β−1
−i (θ 
−i)
ψi(θ−i)ui
 
y,(θi,θ−i)
 
>
 
θ−i∈β−1
−i (θ 
−i)
ψi(θ−i)ui
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
, (3)
and for all θ  
i ∈ Θi:
ui
 
f
 
θ  
i ,θ 
−i
 
,
 
θ  
i ,θ 
−i
  
 ui
 
y,
 
θ  
i ,θ 
−i
  
. (4)
The deception is strictly refutable if, for all θ  
i with f(θ  
i ,θ 
−i)  = y, the inequality (4) is strict.
This gives the following conditions:
Deﬁnition 9 (Robust monotonicity). Social choice function f satisﬁes robust monotonicity if every unacceptable deception is
refutable. Social choice function f satisﬁes strict robust monotonicity if every unacceptable deception is strictly refutable.
It turns out that robust monotonicity implies the incentive compatibility conditions described above, by considering
simple deceptions where a single type of one player has a single possible misreport.9
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Lemma 1. If f satisﬁes robust monotonicity, then f satisﬁes semi-strict EPIC.
Proof. Suppose that f(θi,θ 
−i)  = f(θ 
i,θ 
−i) for some θi, θ 
i and θ 
−i. Then the deception β with
βj(  θj) =
 
{θi,θ 
i}, if (j,  θj) = (i,θi),
{  θj} if otherwise;
is unacceptable. Thus, by robust monotonicity, it is refutable. So for any θ−i,t h e r ee x i s t sy such that
ui
 
y,(θi,θ−i)
 
> ui
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ−i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
,
and for all θ  
i ∈ Θi:
ui
 
f
 
θ  
i ,θ−i
 
,
 
θ  
i ,θ−i
  
 ui
 
y,
 
θ  
i ,θ−i
  
.
Thus
ui
 
f (θi,θ−i),(θi,θ−i)
 
 ui
 
y,(θi,θ−i)
 
> ui
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ−i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
,
which establishes semi-strict EPIC. 
When we prove in Theorem 2 that robust monotonicity (together with an additional condition) is suﬃcient for rational-
izable implementation, we use the fact that every unacceptable deception is refutable. However, in proving the necessity
of strict robust monotonicity in our next result, we use the contrapositive statement that is closer to Maskin’s original for-
mulation of monotonicity: a social choice function satisﬁes strict robust monotonicity if every deception that is not strictly
refutable is acceptable.10 For this argument, it is useful to observe that a deception is not strictly refutable if, for each i, θi,
θ 
i ∈ βi(θi),t h e r ee x i s tθ 
−i ∈ Θ−i and ψi ∈  (β−1
−i (θ 
−i)) such that
ui
 
f
 
θ  
i ,θ 
−i
 
,
 
θ  
i ,θ 
−i
  
> ui
 
y,
 
θ  
i ,θ 
−i
  
, for all θ  
i such that f
 
θ  
i ,θ 
−i
 
 = y, (5)
implies
 
θ−i∈β−1
−i (θ 
−i)
ψi(θ−i)ui
 
f
 
θ  
,θ
 

 
θ−i∈β−1
−i (θ 
−i)
ψi(θ−i)ui(y,θ). (6)
We now establish a necessary condition for rationalizable implementation.
Theorem 1 (Necessary conditions). If f is implementable in rationalizable strategies, then f satisﬁes strict robust monotonicity (and
thus semi-strict EPIC).
By Lemma 1, semi-strict EPIC is also necessary. In the following proof of the theorem, note that some extra steps are
required to deal with the fact that best responses need not exist to all conjectures agents might have about others’ types
and messages.
Proof. Let M be a mechanism that implements f in rationalizable strategies. Suppose that β is not strictly refutable. Deﬁne
Sβ by
S
β
i (θi) 
 
θ 
i∈βi(θi)
SM
i
 
θ 
i
 
.
We claim that Sβ  b(Sβ).T os e ew h y ,ﬁ xa n yi, θi, θ 
i ∈ βi(θi).B e c a u s eβ is not strictly refutable (see (5) and (6)), there
exist θ 
−i ∈ Θ−i and ψi ∈  (β−1
−i (θ 
−i)) such that
ui
 
f
 
θ  
i ,θ 
−i
 
,
 
θ  
i ,θ 
−i
  
> ui
 
y,
 
θ  
i ,θ 
−i
  
, for all θ  
i such that f
 
θ  
i ,θ 
−i
 
 = y,( 7 )
implies
 
θ−i∈β−1
−i (θ 
−i)
ψi(θ−i)ui
 
f
 
θ  
,θ
 

 
θ−i∈β−1
−i (θ 
−i)
ψi(θ−i)ui(y,θ).
10 Discussions with Olivier Tercieux suggested this proof.D. Bergemann, S. Morris / Games and Economic Behavior 71 (2011) 261–281 269
By the deﬁnition of rationalizable implementation, see Deﬁnition 4.2, there exists a belief over the messages m−i,g i v e n
by ν
θ 
−i
i ∈  (SM
−i (θ 
−i)), such that
argmax
mi
 
m−i
ν
θ 
−i
i (m−i)ui
 
g(mi,m−i),
 
θ  
i ,θ 
−i
  
 = ∅, (8)
for all θ  
i ∈ Θi.N o w ,f o re v e r y  mi ∈ Mi,d e ﬁ n e
y(  mi) 
 
m−i
ν
θ 
−i
i (m−i)g(  mi,m−i).
Now if y(  mi)  = f(θ  
i ,θ 
−i),t h e nw em u s th a v e
ui
 
f
 
θ  
i ,θ 
−i
 
,
 
θ  
i ,θ 
−i
  
> ui
 
y(  mi),
 
θ  
i ,θ 
−i
  
,
for if not, then   mi would be rationalizable for type θ  
i , contradicting rationalizable implementation. But now, by (7),
 
θ−i∈β−1
−i (θ 
−i)
ψi(θ−i)ui
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 

 
θ−i∈β−1
−i (θ 
−i)
ψi(θ−i)ui
 
y(  mi),(θi,θ−i)
 
for all   mi, and thus, for any m 
i ∈ SM
i (θ 
i) we have:
 
θ−i∈β−1
−i (θ 
−i),m−i
ψi(θ−i)ν
θ 
−i
i (m−i)ui
 
g
 
m 
i,m−i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
=
 
θ−i∈β−1
−i (θ 
−i)
ψi(θ−i)ui
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 

 
θ−i∈β−1
−i (θ 
−i)
ψi(θ−i)ui
 
y(  mi),(θi,θ−i)
 
=
 
θ−i∈β−1
−i (θ 
−i)
ψi(θ−i)ν
θ 
−i
i (m−i)ui
 
g(  mi,m−i),(θi,θ−i)
 
.
But now Sβ  b(Sβ) ⇒ Sβ  SM ⇒ β is acceptable. 
We observe that the proof of strict robust monotonicity used the full strength of rationalizable implementation given
in Deﬁnition 4.2. In particular, it was required that the same distribution over rationalizable messages of other agents,
ν
θ 
−i
i ∈  (SM
−i (θ 
−i)), guaranteed a best response for every payoff type θ  
i of agent i.
3.2. Suﬃciency
We will need a very weak economic condition to ensure that it is always possible to reward and punish each agent
independently of the other agents.
Deﬁnition 10 (Conditional no total indifference). The conditional no total indifference (NTI) property is satisﬁed if, for all i, θi, θ 
−i
and ψi ∈  (Θ−i),t h e r ee x i s t sy, y  ∈ Yi(θ 
−i) such that
 
θ−i∈Θ−i
ψi(θ−i)ui
 
y,(θi,θ−i)
 
>
 
θ−i∈Θ−i
ψi(θ−i)ui
 
y ,(θi,θ−i)
 
.
The conditional no total indifference property imposes a very weak restriction on the preferences. The conditional NTI
property, together with the use of lotteries, allows us to dispense with any no veto property which typically appear in the
suﬃcient conditions. In addition, we can omit the usual cardinality assumption of I  3. A related no total indifference
condition appears in the context of virtual implementation in Duggan (1997), who requires it to hold at every ex post
proﬁle θ and in Serrano and Vohra (2005), who require it at the interim level for a given belief ψi(θ−i) of player i.270 D. Bergemann, S. Morris / Games and Economic Behavior 71 (2011) 261–281
Theorem 2 (Suﬃcient conditions). If f satisﬁes robust monotonicity and the conditional NTI property, then f is rationalizably imple-
mentable.
Proof. We explicitly construct the implementing mechanism. The mechanism will use “interior” lotteries over the determin-
istic outcome set Z and over the reward sets Yi(θ−i). Given an arbitrary labelling of the outcome set Z ={z0,z1,...,zk,...},
we deﬁne an “interior” lottery over the set Z by
y  (y0, y1,...,yk,...), (9)
where
¯ yk  Pr(z = zk) =
δk
1−δ
,
for some δ ∈ (0,1). For every given proﬁle θ−i,t h er e w a r ds e tYi(θ−i) is by construction a convex set with at most a count-
able number of extreme points. We denote the set of extreme points of Yi(θ−i) by Y∗
i (θ−i) and for some labelling of the
points in the set we have Y∗
i (θ−i) ={y0,θ−i, y1,θ−i,...,yl,θ−i,...}. An extreme point yl,θ−i in Y∗
i (θ−i) may be a deterministic
or a random outcome and assigns probability yl,θ−i(zk) to the pure outcome zk.F o re v e r yr e w a r ds e tY−i(θ−i), we deﬁne an
“interior” lottery:
¯ yθ−i = (¯ y0,θ−i, ¯ y1,θ−i,...,¯ yk,θ−i) (10)
with
¯ yk,θ−i 
1
1−δ
∞  
l=0
δ
lyl,θ−i(zk),
where the lottery ¯ yθ−i is a compound lottery.
Each agent i sends a message mi = (m1
i ,m2
i ,m3
i ,m4
i ), where m1
i ∈ Θi, m2
i ∈ Z+, m3
i : Θ−i → Y with m3
i (θ−i) ∈ Yi(θ−i),
m4
i ∈ Y. The outcome g(m) is determined by the following rules:
Rule 1: If m2
i = 1f o ra l li,p i c k f(m1).
Rule 2: If there exists j ∈ I such that m2
i = 1f o ra l li  = j and m2
j > 1, then pick m3
j(m1
−j) with probability 1 − 1/(m2
j + 1)
and ¯ ym1
−j
(as deﬁned in (10)) with probability 1/(m2
j + 1).
Rule 3: In all other cases, for each i, with probability (1/I)(1−1/(m2
i +1)) pick m4
i , and with probability (1/I)·(1/(m2
i +1))
pick the interior lottery ¯ y (as deﬁned in (9)).
Claim 1. It is never a best reply for type θi to send a message with m2
i > 1( i.e., mi ∈ bi(S) ⇒ m2
i = 1).
Proof of Claim 1. Suppose that θi has conjecture λi ∈  (M−i ×Θ−i). We partition the messages of other agents as follows:
M
2
−i(θ−i) =
 
m−i: m
2
j = 1 for all j  = i and m
1
−i = θ−i
 
, and
M
3
−i =
 
m−i: m
2
j > 1 for some j  = i
 
.
The set M2
−i(θ−i) is the set of messages such that either Rule 1 or Rule 2 is triggered. The set M3
−i is such that either Rule 2
or Rule 3 is triggered. The notation reminds us that if agent i chooses m2
i > 1, then M2
−i(θ−i) and M3
−i trigger Rule 2 and
Rule 3, respectively. By the conditional NTI property, we know that there exists m4
i ∈ Y such that, if
 
m−i∈M3
−i,θ−i∈Θ−i
λi(m−i,θ−i)>0,
then
 
m−i∈M3
−i,θ−i∈Θ−i
λi(m−i,θ−i)ui
 
m
4
i ,θ
 
>
 
m−i∈M3
−i,θ−i∈Θ−i
λi(m−i,θ−i)ui(¯ y,θ). (11)
To wit, the allocation ¯ y, the interior lottery, has full support on the set of deterministic outcomes. By the conditional NTI
property, it follows that there exists a pair of lotteries (y, y ) which can be strictly ranked and hence m4
i can generate a
more favorable lottery than the interior lottery ¯ y, which results in (11). And we also know from the conditional NTI property
that there exists m3
i such that, if
 
m−i∈M2
−i(θ 
−i),θ−i∈Θ−i
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then
 
m−i∈M2
−i(θ 
−i),θ−i∈Θ−i
λi(m−i,θ−i)ui
 
m
3
i
 
θ 
−i
 
,θ
 
>
 
m−i∈M2
−i(θ 
−i),θ−i∈Θ−i
λi(m−i,θ−i)ui(¯ yθ−i,θ),
for the same argument as presented following (11). Thus if (m1
i ,m2
i ,m3
i ,m4
i ) with m2
i > 1 were a best response, then
(m1
i ,m2
i + 1,m3
i ,m4
i ) would be an even better response, a contradiction. 
Claim 2. (θ 
i,m2
i ,m3
i ,m4
i ) ∈ Si(θi) ⇒ f(θ 
i,θ−i) = f(θi,θ−i) for all θ−i ∈ Θ−i.
Proof of Claim 2. Now ﬁx any S with mi ∈ Si(θi) ⇒ m2
i = 1. Let
βi(θi) =
 
θ 
i:
 
θ 
i,1,m
3
i ,m
4
i
 
∈ Si(θi) for some
 
m
3
i ,m
4
i
  
.
We will argue that if β is not acceptable, then b(S)  = S. By robust monotonicity, we know that there exists i, θi, θ 
i ∈ βi(θi)
such that, for all θ 
−i ∈ Θ−i and ψi ∈  (β−1
−i (θ 
−i)),t h e r ee x i s t sy ∈ Yi(θ 
−i) such that
 
θ−i∈Θ−i
ψi(θ−i)ui
 
y,(θi,θ−i)
 
>
 
θ−i∈Θ−i
ψi(θ−i)ui
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
.
But now for any conjecture λi ∈  ({(m−i,θ−i): m2
j = 1f o ra l lj  = i}),t h e r ee x i s t sm3
i (with m3
i (θ−i) ∈ Yi(θ−i))s u c ht h a t
 
m−i,θ−i
λi(m−i,θ−i)ui
 
m
3
i
 
m
1
−i
 
,θ
 
>
 
m−i,θ−i
λi(m−i,θ−i)ui
 
f
 
θ 
i,m
1
−i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
.
Thus message (θ 
i,1,m3
i ,m4
i ) is never a best response for type θi. We conclude that if
βi(θi) =
 
θ 
i:
 
θ 
i,1,m
3
i ,m
4
i
 
∈ SM
i (θi) for some
 
m
3
i ,m
4
i
  
,
then β is acceptable. 
Claim 3. (θi,1,m3
i ,m4
i ) ∈ SM
i (θi) for all i and θi.
Proof of Claim 3. This is an immediate consequence of EPIC, which (by Lemma 1) is implied by strict robust monotonic-
ity. 
It now follows from Claims 1–3 that f is rationalizably implemented. 
Observe that since robust monotonicity and conditional NTI are suﬃcient for rationalizable implementation, and strict
robust monotonicity is necessary for rationalizable implementation, it follows that robust monotonicity and conditional NTI
must imply strict robust monotonicity. It is straightforward to check this directly.
We allowed for badly behaved inﬁnite mechanisms in order to make a tight connection with the existing literature and
to get tight results. Many authors have argued that “integer game” constructions, like the one used in the above theorem,
should be viewed with suspicion (see, e.g., Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) and Jackson (1992)).
3.3. A coordination example
We conclude this section with an example that demonstrates that while rationalizable implementation is a strong re-
quirement, it is weaker than dominant strategy implementation. In the example there are two agents, i = 1,2. Each agent
i has two possible types, θi and θ 
i. There are six possible outcomes: Z ={ a,b,c,d,z,z }. The payoffs of the agents are a
function of the allocation and the true payoff type proﬁle, given by:
a θ2 θ 
2
θ1 3,3 0,0
θ 
1 0,0 1,1
b θ2 θ 
2
θ1 0,0 3,3
θ 
1 1,1 0,0
c θ2 θ 
2
θ1 0,0 1,1
θ 
1 3,3 0,0
d θ2 θ 
2
θ1 1,1 0,0
θ 
1 0,0 3,3
(12)
and
z θ2 θ 
2
θ1 2,2 2,0
θ 
1 2,2 2,0
z  θ2 θ 
2
θ1 2,0 2,2
θ 
1 2,0 2,2
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The social choice function is given by the eﬃcient outcome at each type proﬁle:
f θ2 θ 
2
θ1 a b
θ 
1 c d
. (13)
Clearly, the social choice function is strictly ex post incentive compatible. But in the “direct mechanism” where each agent
simply reports his type, there will always be an equilibrium where each type of each agent misreports his type, and each
agent gets a payoff of 1. This is also strictly ex post incentive compatible. The social choice function f which selects among
{a,b,c,d} embeds a coordination game. We further observe that the payoff for agent 1 from allocations z and z  are equal
and constant for all type proﬁles. On the other hand, the payoff of agent 2 from z and z  depends on his type but not on
the type of the other agent.
We now consider the following augmented, but ﬁnite, mechanism which responds to the messages of the agents as
follows:
g θ2 θ 
2
θ1 a b
θ 
1 c d
ζ z z 
.
The augmented mechanism enriches the message space of agent 1 by a single message ζ. The corresponding incomplete
information game has the following payoffs:
type θ2 θ 
2
type action θ2 θ 
2 θ2 θ 
2
θ1 θ1 3,3 0,0 0,0 3,3
θ 
1 0,0 1,1 1,1 0,0
ζ 2,2 2,0 2,0 2,2
θ 
1 θ1 0,0 1,1 1,1 0,0
θ 
1 3,3 0,0 0,0 3,3
ζ 2,2 2,0 2,0 2,2
.
Suppose we iteratively remove actions for each type that could never be a best response given the type action proﬁles
remaining. Thus in the ﬁrst round, we would observe that type θ1 would never send message θ 
1 and type θ 
1 would never
send message θ1. Knowing this, we could conclude that type θ2 would never send message θ 
2 and type θ 
2 would never send
message θ2. This in turn implies that neither type of agent 1 will ever send message ζ. Thus the only remaining message
for each type of each agent is truth-telling. But now they must behave this way in any equilibrium on any type space.
4. Robust implementation
We now establish the equivalence between rationalizable and robust implementation. We ﬁrst report a formal epistemic
argument that relates the rationalizable messages to the set of messages that might be played in any equilibrium on any
type space. We use the notation of type spaces that we introduced in Section 2.2.
Proposition 1 (Rationalizable actions). mi ∈ SM
i (θi) if and only if there exists a type space T , an interim equilibrium σ of the game
(T ,M) and a type ti ∈ Ti such that (i) σi(mi|ti)>0 and (ii)  θi(ti) = θi.
Proof. (⇒) Suppose m∗
i ∈ SM(θ∗
i ). Now consider the following type space T deﬁned through Ti  {(mi,θi) | mi ∈ SM
i (θi)}
and let   θi(mi,θi)  θi. By the deﬁnition of rationalizability, we know that for each mi ∈ SM
i (θi),t h e r ee x i s t sλ
mi,θi
i ∈  (M−i×
Θ−i) such that λ
mi,θi
i (m−i,θ−i)>0 ⇒ mj ∈ SM
j (θj) for each j  = i; and
 
m−i,θ−i
λ
mi,θi
i (m−i,θ−i)
 
ui
 
g(mi,m−i),(θi,θ−i)
 
− ui
 
g
 
m 
i,m−i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
  
 0, ∀m 
i ∈ Mi.
Let   πi(m−i,θ−i)[mi,θi]  λ
mi,θi
i (m−i,θ−i). Now by construction, there is a pure strategy equilibrium s with si(mi,θi) = mi.
But now si(m∗
i ,θ∗
i ) = m∗
i and   θ(m∗
i ,θ∗
i ) = θ∗
i .
(⇐) Suppose there exists a type space T , an equilibrium σ of (T ,M), and m∗
i ∈ Mi and t∗
i ∈ Ti such that σi(m∗
i |t∗
i )>0
and   θi(t∗
i ) = θ∗
i .L e tD. Bergemann, S. Morris / Games and Economic Behavior 71 (2011) 261–281 273
Si(θi) =
 
mi: σi(mi|ti)>0a n d  θi(ti) = θi for some ti ∈ Ti
 
.
Now interim equilibrium conditions ensure that b(S)  S.T h u sS  SM.T h u sm∗
i ∈ SM
i (  θi(t∗
i )), which concludes the
proof. 
We emphasize that the above equivalence result does not guarantee that there exist an equilibrium on every type space.
Since there may be an inﬁnite number of messages, the existence of an equilibrium is in fact not guaranteed. We will use
the following condition in establishing the existence of interim equilibria on all type spaces. The condition uses the notion
of message correspondence S deﬁned in Section 2.4.
Deﬁnition 11 (Ex post best response). The message correspondence S satisﬁes the ex post best response property in the
mechanism (g,M) if, for all i and θi ∈ Θi,t h e r ee x i s t sm∗
i ∈ Si(θi) such that:
m∗
i ∈ argmax
mi∈Mi
ui
 
g(mi,m−i),(θi,θ−i)
 
,
for all θ−i and m−i ∈ S−i(θ−i).
This condition requires that for each i and θi, there is a single message which is rationalizable whatever agent i’s beliefs
about others’ payoff types.
Theorem 3 (Almost equivalence).
1. If f is rationalizably implementable by mechanism M,a n dS M satisﬁes the ex post best response property, then f is robustly
implementable by mechanism M.
2. If f is robustly implementable by mechanism M, then f is rationalizably implementable by mechanism M.
Proof. (1) By the ex post best response property, there exists, for each i, s∗
i : Θi → Mi such that
s∗
i (θi) ∈ argmax
mi∈Mi
ui
 
g
 
mi,s∗
−i(θ−i)
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
for all θ−i. Now ﬁx any type space. The strategy proﬁle s with si(ti) = s∗
i (  θi(ti)) is an equilibrium of the game (T ,M).T h u s
an interim equilibrium s(t) with the property that g(s(t)) = f(  θ(t)) exist for every type space T . Now by Proposition 1,
every equilibrium action mi which is chosen with positive probability, σi(mi|ti)>0, is also a rationalizable action.
(2). Suppose (T ,M) has an equilibrium for each T .F i xa n yi and ψi ∈  (Θ−i).F i xa n yt y p es p a c eT with, for each
θi ∈ Θi,at y p et∗
i (θi) such that (a)   θi(t∗
i (θi)) = θi for each θi,( b )t h e r ee x i s t sπi ∈  (T−i) such that   πi(t∗
i (θi)) =πi for all θi
and (c)
 
{t−i:  θ−i(t−i)=θ−i}
πi(t−i) = ψi(θ−i) (14)
for all θi and θ−i. The game has an equilibrium σ.L e tmi be any message with σi(mi|t∗
i (θi)) > 0. Let
λi(m−i,θ−i) =
 
{t−i∈T−i:   θ−i(t−i)=θ−i}
σ−i(m−i|t−i)πi(t−i).
Now σi(mi|t∗
i (θi)) > 0i m p l i e s
mi(θi) ∈ argmax
mi∈Mi
 
m−i,θ−i
λi(m−i,θ−i)ui
 
g(mi,m−i),(θi,θ−i)
 
.
Proposition 1 implies that every message proﬁle mj which is played in equilibrium by type θj is part of the set SM,o r
that:
λi(m−i,θ−i)>0 ⇒ mj ∈ SM
j (θj) for each j  = i.
By construction of the type space T , in particular property (c) as expressed by (14), this implies that
 
m−i∈M−i
λi(m−i,θ−i) = ψi(θ−i) for all θ−i ∈ Θ−i.
Since these properties hold for arbitrary i and ψi ∈  (Θ−i), part (2) of the deﬁnition of rationalizable implementation is
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It is unfortunate that there is a gap in the above proposition. However, an example in the appendix shows that it is
possible to construct (admittedly silly) mechanisms where (T ,M) has an equilibrium for each T ,b u tSM fails the ex post
best response property.
Corollary 1.
1. If f is robustly implementable, then f satisﬁes EPIC and strict robust monotonicity;
2. If f satisﬁes EPIC, robust monotonicity and the conditional NTI property, then f is robustly implementable.
Proof. (1.) It follows immediately from Theorem 3.2 that if f robustly implementable then it is also rationalizably imple-
mentable, and if follows from Theorem 1 that if f is rationalizably implementable, then it satisﬁes EPIC and strict robust
monotonicity.
(2.) By Theorem 2, if f satisﬁes EPIC, robust monotonicity and the conditional NTI property, then f is rationalizably
implementable. Now since f satisﬁes EPIC, we observe that SM must satisfy the ex post best response property, with type
θi sending a message of the form (θi,1,m3
i ,m4
i ), and so robust implementation is possible by Theorem 3.1. 
5. Finite mechanisms
In this section, we restrict attention to ﬁnite mechanisms, i.e. where each Mi is ﬁnite. All the results in this section
extend to compact or, more generally, “regular” mechanisms (e.g., mechanisms where best responses always exist as in
Abreu and Matsushima (1992b)). We present a different necessary condition – robust measurability – that arises when
attention is restricted to ﬁnite mechanisms.11 We can also use the case of ﬁnite mechanisms to discuss the relationship
with some of our earlier work providing suﬃcient conditions for implementation using well behaved mechanisms by (i)
restricting attention to more restrictive environments (Bergemann and Morris, 2009a) or (ii) allowing virtual implementation
(Bergemann and Morris, 2009b).
5.1. Necessary condition
We report an additional necessary condition (from Bergemann and Morris (2009b)) for robust implementation in ﬁnite
mechanisms. We are interested in the set of preferences that an agent might have if his payoff type is θi and he knows that
the type θj of each opponent j belongs to some subset Ψj of his payoff types Θj.W r i t eR for the set of expected utility
preference relations on lotteries Y.W ew i l lw r i t eRθi,ψi ∈ R for the preference relation of agent i if his payoff type is θi and
he has belief ψi ∈  (Θ−i) about the types of others:
∀y, y  ∈ Y : yRθi,ψi y  ⇔
 
θ−i∈Θ−i
ψi(θ−i)ui
 
y,(θi,θ−i)
 

 
θ−i∈Θ−i
ψi(θ−i)ui
 
y ,(θi,θ−i)
 
.
We write Ri(θi,Ψ−i) for the set of preferences agent i might have if his payoff type is θi and he might have any beliefs
over others’ payoff types:
Ri(θi,Ψ−i) 
 
R ∈ R | R = Rθi,ψi for some ψi ∈  (Ψ−i)
 
.
Say that type set proﬁle Ψ−i separates Ψi if
 
θi∈Ψi
Ri(θi,Ψ−i) = ∅.
Let Ξ = (Ξi)I
i=1 ⊆× I
i=12Θi be a proﬁle of type sets for each agent. Say that Ξ is mutually inseparable if, for each i and
Ψi ∈ Ξi,t h e r ee x i s t sΨ−i ∈ Ξ−i such that Ψ−i does not separate Ψi.
Deﬁnition 12 (Robust measurability). Social choice function f satisﬁes robust measurability if Ξ mutually inseparable, Ψi ∈ Ξi
and {θ 
i,θ  
i }⊆Ψi ⇒ f(θ 
i,θ−i) = f(θ  
i ,θ−i) for all θ−i.
If payoff types are ﬁnite, one can give an alternative iterative deﬁnition of robust measurability: let Ξ0
i = 2Θi, and
inductively deﬁne:
Ξ
k+1
i =
 
Ψi ∈ Ξ
k
i | Ψ−i does not separate Ψi, for some Ψ−i ∈ Ξ
k
−i
 
,
and
11 While the stronger necessary conditions apply even if we allow inﬁnite payoff type spaces, clearly only very restrictive social choice functions can be
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Ξ∗
i =
 
k0
Ξ
k
i .
Now we say that a social choice function f satisﬁes robust measurability if
 
θ 
i,θ  
i
 
∈ Ξ∗
i ⇒ f
 
θ 
i,θ−i
 
= f
 
θ  
i ,θ−i
 
for all θ−i.
Bergemann and Morris (2009b) showed that robust measurability was necessary for robust virtual implementation; thus it
must also be necessary of robust exact implementation. For completeness, we report a direct argument here.
Proposition 2 (Necessity of robust measurability). If social choice function f is robustly implementable by a ﬁnite mechanism, then f
satisﬁes robust measurability.
Proof. Since f is robustly implementable, there exists a mechanism M such that
m ∈ SM(θ) ⇒ g(m) = f (θ).
Now suppose Ξ is mutually inseparable. We argue by induction that, for all i, Ψi ∈ Ξi and k there exists a set of messages
∅  = Mk
i (Ψi) ⊆ S
M,k
i (θi) for all θi ∈ Ψi. This is true by deﬁnition for k = 0. Suppose that it is true for k.N o wΞ being
mutually inseparable implies that for any Ψi ∈ Ξi,t h e r ee x i s t sΨ−i ∈ Ξ−i, R and, for each θi ∈ Ψi, λ
θi
i ∈  (Ψ−i) such that
R
θi,λ
θi
i
= R.N o wl e tM
k+1
i (Ψi) be the optimal messages of agent i when he believes that his opponents will sent some
message proﬁle in Mk
−i(Ψ−i) with probability 1 and has beliefs λ
θi
i about the type proﬁle of his opponents, i.e.,
M
k+1
i (Ψi) =
 
m−i∈Mk
−i(Ψ−i)
argmax
m 
i
 
θ−i
λ
θi
i (θ−i)ui
 
g
 
m 
i,m−i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
.
By construction, ∅  = M
k+1
i (Ψi) ⊆ S
M,k+1
i (θi) for all θi ∈ Ψi.N o wf o re a c hΨi ∈ Ξi, Mk
i (Ψi) is a decreasing sequence under
set inclusion. Since Mi is ﬁnite, there exists
M∗
i (Ψi) =
 
k0
M
k
i (Ψi)  = ∅.
Thus M∗
i (Ψi) ⊆ SM
i (θi) for all θi ∈ Ψi.N o wi f{θ 
i,θ  
i }⊆Ψi,t h e r ee x i s t smi ∈ M∗
i (Ψi) ⊆ SM
i (θ 
i) and mi ∈ M∗
i (Ψi) ⊆ SM
i (θ  
i ).
Now ﬁx any m−i ∈ SM
−i (θ−i), and we have (mi,m−i) ∈ SM(θ 
i,θ−i) ⇒ g(mi,m−i) = f(θ 
i,θ−i) and (mi,m−i) ∈ SM(θ  
i ,θ−i) ⇒
g(mi,m−i) = f(θ  
i ,θ−i).T h u s f(θ 
i,θ−i) = f(θ  
i ,θ−i). 
In Appendix A of the working paper version, Bergemann and Morris (2008b), we show by means of two examples that
robust monotonicity does not imply nor is it implied by robust measurability.
5.2. Suﬃcient conditions
We have pursued two ways of deriving suﬃcient conditions in prior work. First, we showed that if we weaken the
implementation requirement to virtual implementation (Bergemann and Morris, 2009b), then the above robust measurability
condition is suﬃcient (under weak conditions ruling out indifference). Second, we identiﬁed natural restrictions on the
environment that make the necessary conditions suﬃcient (Bergemann and Morris, 2009a); we brieﬂy review this result
below. If we neither put restrictions on the environment nor allow virtual implementation, then we do not know how to
derive tight suﬃcient conditions for ﬁnite, or other well-behaved, mechanisms. However, as in the existing literature on
complete and incomplete information implementation, it was possible to obtain tight conditions only if we allow for badly
behaved mechanisms.
5.3. Single crossing aggregator environments
In Bergemann and Morris (2009a), we consider payoff environments in which each payoff type space Θi is completely
ordered and where there exist for each i, an aggregator function hi : Θ → R and a valuation function vi : Y × R → R such
that
vi
 
y,hi(θ)
 
 ui(y,θ), (15)
where hi is continuous and strictly increasing in θi and vi : Y ×R → R is continuous and satisﬁes the following strict single
crossing property: for all φ<φ   <φ   ,
vi(y,φ)>vi
 
y ,φ
 
and vi
 
y,φ  
= vi
 
y ,φ  
⇒ vi
 
y,φ   
< vi
 
y ,φ   
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The aggregator functions h = (hi)I
i=1 are said to satisfy the contraction property if, for all deceptions β  = β∗,t h e r ee x i s t si, θi
and θ 
i ∈ βi(θi) with θ 
i  = θi, such that
sign
 
θi −θ 
i
 
= sign
 
hi(θi,θ−i)−hi
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
for all θ−i and θ 
−i ∈ β−i(θ−i). We recall that we earlier deﬁned β∗ as the truthtelling “deception”, with β∗
i (θi) = θi,f o r
all θi ∈ Θi and all i. In single crossing aggregator environments as described by (15) and (16), the contraction property is
equivalent to both strict robust monotonicity and robust measurability.
We say that a social choice function f is responsive if for all θi  = θ 
i,t h e r ee x i s t sθ−i such that f(θi,θ−i)  = f(θ 
i,θ−i).
Proposition 3 (Contraction property). In a single crossing aggregator environment, a responsive social choice function f is robustly
implementable if and only if it satisﬁes strict ex post incentive compatibility and the contraction property.
This result is reported in Theorem 1 and 2 of Bergemann and Morris (2009a). It follows that the necessary conditions
of Theorem 1 are also suﬃcient in these environments. Note that in the discrete type setting of this paper, the continuity
properties are automatically satisﬁed if the payoff type spaces are ﬁnite. Bergemann and Morris (2009a) allowed for compact
payoff type spaces and pure outcome spaces; they also showed that when robust implementation is possible, it is possible
in a “direct” mechanism where agents report just their payoff types.
6. Extensions, variations and discussion
6.1. Responsive social choice functions
In Bergemann and Morris (2009a), we considered a less general environment and also assumed that the social choice
function was responsive in the following sense:
Deﬁnition 13 (Responsive social choice function). Social choice function f is responsive if, for all i and θ 
i  = θi,t h e r ee x i s t sθ−i
such that f(θi,θ−i)  = f(θ 
i,θ−i).
Thus a social choice function is said to be responsive if distinct payoff types lead to distinct outcomes under the social
choice function. Because the objective of this paper was to investigate general environments and social choice functions, we
did not assume responsiveness here. However, we brieﬂy note in this section how some of our results – in particular, the
necessity arguments – can be strengthened with responsiveness but in the general payoff environment of this paper. First,
semi-strict EPIC immediately implies strict EPIC:
Deﬁnition 14 (Strict EPIC). Social choice function f satisﬁes strict ex post incentive compatibility (strict EPIC) if, for each i,
θi  = θ 
i:
ui
 
f (θi,θ−i),(θi,θ−i)
 
> ui
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ−i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
, ∀θ−i.
Second, under strict EPIC, strict robust monotonicity is implied by the following weakening:
Deﬁnition 15 (Strict pairwise robust monotonicity). A social choice function f satisﬁes strict pairwise robust monotonicity if,
for every unacceptable deception β,t h e r ee x i s ti, θi, θ 
i ∈ βi(θi) such that, for all θ 
−i ∈ Θ−i and ψi ∈  (β−1
−i (θ 
−i)),t h e r e
exists y such that:
 
θ−i∈β−1
−i (θ 
−i)
ψi(θ−i)ui
 
y,(θi,θ−i)
 
>
 
θ−i∈β−1
−i (θ 
−i)
ψi(θ−i)ui
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
,
and:
ui
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
,
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
> ui
 
y,
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
  
. (17)
If we required condition (17) is to hold not only for θ 
i,b u ta l s of o ra n yθ  
i , then this condition becomes strict robust
monotonicity. We label it “pairwise” monotonicity because it involves only pairwise comparisons of types.
Finally, for responsive social choice functions, we can also establish necessary conditions under a less stringent deﬁnition
of rationalizable implementation. In particular, we can weaken the requirement (c) from Deﬁnition 4.2 of rationalizable
implementation by dropping the uniformity condition: “for all θi ∈ Θi” and instead can allow the belief λi ∈  (M−i × Θ−i)
to depend on the type θi. We can also establish the necessity of semi-strict EPIC and strict pairwise robust monotonicity
under this weakened notion, and, as noted above, with responsive social choice functions, the former implies strict EPIC
and the latter imply strict robust monotonicity. The proofs of the claims in this subsection are in the appendix of theD. Bergemann, S. Morris / Games and Economic Behavior 71 (2011) 261–281 277
working paper version (Bergemann and Morris, 2010). These result are analogues of complete information results developed
in Bergemann et al. (2010).12
6.2. Finite outcomes and states and duality
We say that an environment is ﬁnite if pure outcome space Z and payoff type spaces Θi are all ﬁnite. We can give a sim-
pler characterization of when a deception is refutable and thus when a social choice function satisﬁes robust monotonicity
in ﬁnite environments:
Lemma 2 (Refutable deception). In ﬁnite environments, a deception β is refutable if there exist i, θi, θ 
i ∈ βi(θi) such that, for all
θ 
−i ∈ Θ−i, there exists y ∈ Y such that for all θ−i ∈ β−1
−i (θ 
−i):
ui
 
y,(θi,θ−i)
 
> ui
 
f
 
θ 
i,θ 
−i
 
,(θi,θ−i)
 
, (18)
and for all θ  
i ∈ Θi:
ui
 
f
 
θ  
i ,θ 
−i
 
,
 
θ  
i ,θ 
−i
  
 ui
 
y,
 
θ  
i ,θ 
−i
  
. (19)
The deception is strictly refutable if, for all θ  
i with f(θ  
i ,θ 
−i)  = y, the inequality (19) is strict.
We can also give a analogous simpler characterization of conditional NTI:
Lemma 3 (Conditional no total indifference). In ﬁnite environments, the conditional no total indifference (NTI) property is satisﬁed if,
for all i, θi, θ 
−i, there exists y, y  ∈ Yi(θ 
−i) such that ui(y,(θi,θ−i)) > ui(y ,(θi,θ−i)) for all θ−i ∈ Θ−i.
These lemmas are proved in Appendix A. By using a duality argument, the ﬁnite versions of refutable deception and
conditional no total indifference can be stated pointwise for every proﬁle (θi,θ−i) rather than in expectations using distri-
butions ψi(θ−i) ∈  (Θ−i).
6.3. Lotteries, pure strategies and Bayesian implementation
Here we discuss how Theorem 1 is related to the classic literature on Bayesian implementation developed by Postlewaite
and Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) and Jackson (1991). These authors asked whether it was possible to
implement a social choice function in equilibrium on a ﬁxed type space T .13 These authors analyzed the classic problem
where attention was restricted to pure strategy equilibria and deterministic mechanisms. The assumption entails that the
social choice function is a mapping f : Θ → Z and the mechanism g : M → Z. Note that in this classical approach it was
not necessary to even deﬁne agent’s preferences over lotteries.
Having ﬁxed a type space, the natural notion of a pure strategy deception on the ﬁxed type space is a collection α =
(α1,...,αI),w i t he a c hαi : Ti → Ti.T h u sα : T → T is deﬁned by α(t) = (αi(ti))I
i=1. In this section we maintain that the
payoff type space Θi and the pure outcome space Z are ﬁnite. The key monotonicity notion, translated into our language,
is then the following:
Deﬁnition 16 (Bayesian monotonicity). Social choice function f satisﬁes Bayesian monotonicity on type space T if, for every
deception α with f(  θ(t))  = f(  θ(α(t))) for some t,t h e r ee x i s t si, ti and k : T → Z such that
 
t−i
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,  θ(t)
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, ∀t 
i.
Jackson (1991) shows that this condition is necessary for Bayesian implementation, and that a slight strengthening,
Bayesian monotonicity no veto, is suﬃcient. We can also show that our robust monotonicity condition is equivalent to the
requirement that Bayesian monotonicity is satisﬁed on all type spaces.
12 We are grateful to Olivier Tercieux for suggesting that we pursue the implications of responsive social choice functions in current setting.
13 They allowed for more general social choice sets, but we restrict attention to functions for our comparison.278 D. Bergemann, S. Morris / Games and Economic Behavior 71 (2011) 261–281
Theorem 4 (Equivalence). Social choice function f satisﬁes Bayesian monotonicity on every type space if and only if it satisﬁes robust
monotonicity.
The equivalence is established by a constructive proof via a speciﬁc type space. The constructive element is the iden-
tiﬁcation of a type space on which Bayesian monotonicity is guaranteed to fail if robust monotonicity fails. The speciﬁc
type space is much smaller than the universal type space. The proof of this result is in the appendix of the working paper
version, Bergemann and Morris (2008b).
The notion of robustness is more subtle in the context of full rather than partial implementation. With partial imple-
mentation, i.e. truthtelling in the direct mechanism, the universal type space is by deﬁnition the most diﬃcult type space
to obtain truthtelling. In the universal type space, every agent has the maximal number of possible misreports and hence
the designer faces the maximal number of incentive constraints. In the context of full implementation, the trade-off is am-
biguous. As a larger type space contains by deﬁnition more types, it offers every agent more possibilities to misreport. But
then, just as a larger type space made truthtelling more diﬃcult to obtain, the other equilibria might also cease to exist
after the introduction of additional types. This second part offers the possibility that larger type spaces facilitate rather than
complicate the full implementation problem.
But note that this line of argument would establish the necessity of robust implementation if the planner is restricted
to deterministic mechanisms (a disadvantage) but he can assume that agents follow pure strategies (an advantage). How do
these assumptions matter?
First, observe that the advantage of restricting attention to pure strategies goes away completely when we require im-
plementation on all type spaces: if there is a mixed strategy equilibrium that results in a socially sub-optimal outcome
on some type space, we can immediately construct a larger type space (purifying the original equilibrium) where the so-
cially sub-optimal outcome is played in a pure strategy equilibrium. Thus our robust analysis conveniently removes that
unfortunate gap between pure and mixed strategy implementation that has plagued the implementation literature.
We use the extension to stochastic mechanisms in just two places. Ex post incentive compatibility and robust monotonic-
ity would remain necessary conditions even if we restricted attention to deterministic mechanisms (the arguments would
be unchanged). If lotteries were not allowed, our suﬃciency argument would require a strengthened version of the robust
monotonicity condition, with the lottery y replaced by a deterministic outcome. Our suﬃciency argument also uses lotteries
under Rules 1 and 2. As in recent papers by Benoit and Ok (2008) and Bochet (2007) on complete information implementa-
tion, we use lotteries to signiﬁcantly weaken the suﬃcient conditions, so that we require only the conditional NTI property
in addition to EPIC and robust monotonicity. If we did not allow lotteries in this part of the argument, we would require a
much stronger economic condition in the spirit of Jackson’s “Bayesian monotonicity no veto” condition. We have developed
combined robust monotonicity and economic conditions (not reported here) suﬃcient for interim implementation on all full
support types spaces. However, an additional complication is that, without lotteries in the implementing mechanism, we
cannot establish suﬃciency on type spaces where agents have disjoint supports.
It is possible to construct a simple example where EPIC and robust monotonicity are not suﬃcient for robust monotonic-
ity without lotteries by taking the coordination example of Section 3.3 but removing the outcomes z and z .A sw es h o w
in Appendix A, robust implementation is then not possible in this example despite the fact that the social choice function
selects a unique strictly Pareto-dominant outcome at every type proﬁle.
6.4. Ex post and robust implementation
In contrast to the earlier results in Bergemann and Morris (2005), where we showed that robust partial implementation
is equivalent to ex post incentive compatibility, robust implementation is in general a more demanding notion of implemen-
tation than ex post equilibrium implementation. In Bergemann and Morris (2008a) we have analyzed ex post equilibrium
implementation. The monotonicity condition there, called ex post monotonicity, is identical to the robust monotonicity con-
dition up to the notion of deception. For ex post monotonicity we have to verify point-to-point deceptions, αi : Θi → Θi,
whereas for robust monotonicity we have to verify point-to-set deceptions βi : Θi → 2Θi/∅. The following simple example,
introduced by Palfrey and Srivastava (1989), is useful to relate the different implementation notions and also to understand
the role of interdependent types.
Consider a setting with three agents where each agent has two possible “payoff types”, θa or θb. There are two possible
choices for society, a or b. All agents have identical preferences. If a majority of agents (i.e., at least two) are of type θy,
then every agent gets utility 1 from outcome y and utility 0 from the other outcome. The social choice function agrees with
the common preferences of the agents. Thus f :{ θa,θ b}3 →{ a,b} satisﬁes f(θ) = y if and only if #{i: θi = θy}  2.
Clearly, ex post incentive compatibility is not a problem in this example. The problem is that in the “direct mechanism”
– where all agents simply announce their types – there is the possibility that all agents will choose to always announce θa.
Since no agent expects to be pivotal, he has no incentive to truthfully announce his type when he is in fact θb. What
happens if we allow more complicated mechanisms?
If there were complete information about agents’ preferences, then the social choice function is clearly implementable:
the social planner could pick an agent, say agent 1, and simply follow that agent’s recommendation.
But suppose instead that there is incomplete information about agents’ preferences. In particular, suppose it is common
knowledge that each agent’s type is θb with independent probability q,w i t hq2 > 1
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tonicity condition of Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) and Jackson (1991). Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) observe that it is
also not possible to implement in undominated Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this example.
In contrast, it is easy to construct an augmented mechanism whose only ex post equilibrium delivers the social choice
function. Let each agent send a message mi ∈{ θa,θ b}×{ truth, lie}, with the interpretation that an agent is announcing his
own type and also sends the message “truth” if he thinks that others are telling the truth and sends the message “lie” if he
thinks that someone is lying. Outcome y is implemented if a majority claim to be type θy and all agents announce “truth”;
or if either 1 or 3 agents claim to be type θy and at least one agent reports lying.
There is a truthtelling ex post equilibrium where each agent truthfully announces his type and also announces “truth”.
Now suppose there exists an ex post equilibrium such that at some type proﬁle, the desired outcome is not chosen. Note
that whatever the announcements of the other agents, each agent always has the ability to determine the outcome y,b y
sending the message “lie” and – given the announcements of the other agents – choosing his message so that an odd
number of agents have claimed to be type θy. So this is not consistent with ex post equilibrium.
Robust implementation is impossible in this example. Consider the type space where there is common knowledge that
whenever an agent is type θy, he assigns probability 1
2 to both of the other agents being type y   = y and probability 1
2 to
one being type y and the other being y . Thus every type of every agent thinks there is a 50% chance that outcome a is
better and a 50% chance that b is better. Evidently, there is no way of designing a mechanism that ensures that agents do
not fully pool. But if they fully pool, robust implementation is not possible.
6.5. Extensions
The previous sections examined the importance of our assumptions about lotteries over outcomes and restrictions on
mechanisms. We also restricted attention in our main analysis to the case of discrete but inﬁnite pure outcomes Z,p a y o f f
types Θi and types Ti. While most of our results would extend naturally to more general Z, Θi and Ti, the formal treatment
of non-compact type spaces would raise technical issues that we have chosen to avoid.
Appendix A
A.1. Robust monotonicity and dual robust monotonicity
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that β is (strictly) refutable. Then there exist i, θi, θ 
i ∈ βi(θi) such that, for all θ 
−i ∈ Θ−i,t h e r e
exists a compact set Y ⊆ Y such that y ∈ Y implies
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By the equivalence between strict domination and never a best response (see Theorem 2.10 in Gale (1989)), there exists
y∗ ∈ Y with ui(y∗,(θi,θ−i)) > ui( f(θ 
i,θ 
−i),(θi,θ−i)) for all θ−i ∈ β−1
−i (θ 
−i). This establishes the conditions of the lemma. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose conditional NTI holds. Then, for each i, θi, θ 
−i, there exists a compact set Y  Yi(θ 
−i) such that
y ∈ Y implies
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for all θ  
i .W r i t i n gy for a lottery strictly in the interior of Y, we also have that for each ψi ∈  (Θ−i),t h e r ee x i s t sy ∈ Y
such that
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By the equivalence between strict domination and never a best response (see Theorem 2.10 in Gale (1989)), there exists
y∗ ∈ Y with ui(y∗,(θi,θ−i)) > ui(y,(θi,θ−i)) for all θ−i ∈ Θ−i. This establishes the conditions of the lemma. 
A.2. A badly behaved mechanism
The example illustrates the gap between the necessary and suﬃcient conditions in Theorem 3. Speciﬁcally, it shows that
there can be an equilibrium for every type space T in a mechanism, yet SM does not satisfy the ex post best response280 D. Bergemann, S. Morris / Games and Economic Behavior 71 (2011) 261–281
property. In the example, there are two agents and there is complete information, so each agent has a unique payoff type.
There are a ﬁnite number of outcomes Z ={ a,b,c}.T h ep a y o f f sa r eg i v e nb y :
a b c
agent 1 0 −1 +1
agent 2 0 0 0
.
The planner’s choice (in the unique payoff state) is a. Thus it is trivial to robustly implement the social choice function. But
suppose that the planner chooses the following (strange) mechanism: M1 ={ 1,2,3,...}, M2 ={ 1,2} and
g(m1,m2) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
a, if m1 = 1;
b, if m1 > 1a n dm2 = 1;
[ 1
m1,b;(1− 1
m1),c], if m1 > 1a n dm2 = 2.
where [ 1
m1,b;(1− 1
m1),c] is the lottery putting probability 1
m1 on b and probability (1− 1
m1) on c. Thus the outcome function
g(m1,m2) and the payoffs of the associated complete information game can be represented by the following tables:
g(m1,m2) 1 2
1 a a
2 b [ 1
2,b; 1
2,c]
3 b [ 1
3,b; 2
3,c]
. . .
. . .
. . .
k b [1
k,b;1− 1
k,c]
. . .
. . .
. . .
ui(m1,m2) 1 2
1 0,0 0,0
2 −1,0 0,0
3 −1,0 1
3,0
. . .
. . .
. . .
k −1,0 1− 2
k,0
. . .
. . .
. . .
.
Now on any type space, there is always an equilibrium where agent 1 and 2 chooses action 1, and outcome a is realized.
Moreover, on any type space, in any equilibrium, outcome a is always chosen: if agent 1 ever has a best response not to
play 1 then he has no best response. So he always plays 1 in equilibrium. Thus the trivial social choice function is robustly
implemented by this mechanism.
While only message 1 survives iterated deletion of never best responses for agent 1, both messages survive iterated
deletion of never best responses for agent 2. Thus we have SM
1 ={ 1} and SM
2 ={ 1,2}. Note that SM does not satisfy the
interim best response property as we observe that
u1
 
g(1,2)
 
= u1(a) = 0 <
1
3
= u1
 
g(3,2)
 
,
violating the ex post best response property. The insight of the example is that the quantiﬁer “for every type space T ”d o e s
not guarantee that all actions which will be chosen with positive probability in some equilibrium and for some type space,
will also be chosen with probability one in some equilibrium for some type space. For this reason, the quantiﬁer “for every
type space T ” does not allow us to establish a local, i.e. ex post best response property of every action in SM.
A.3. Coordination example continued
The ﬁnal example is the pure coordination game, which we ﬁrst considered in Section 3.3, but without the additional
allocations, z and z . It illustrates the importance of lotteries for robust implementation. The example will satisfy EPIC and
robust monotonicity, yet it cannot be robustly implemented without the use of lotteries. On the other hand the preferences
clearly satisfy the conditional NTI property, and hence the suﬃcient conditions for robust implementation would be satisﬁed
with lotteries.
As in the example in Section 3.3, the payoffs of the player are given by (12) and the social choice function f is given
by (13). The social choice function f satisﬁes strict EPIC but there is another equilibrium in the “direct mechanism” where
each agent misreports his type, and each agent gets a payoff of 1.
Robust monotonicity is clearly satisﬁed even if the rewards Yi(θ−i) are restricted to the deterministic allocations Z.W e
next show that robust implementation is not possible even in an inﬁnite mechanism if we restrict attention to deterministic
mechanisms. Fix a mechanism M.L e t
S∗
i (θi) =
 
mi: g(mi,mj) = f (θi,θj) for some mj,θj
 
,
be the set of messages for agent i which would select the allocation recommended by the social choice function for some
mj,θj. We establish by induction that, S∗
i (θi) ⊆ Sk
i (θi) for all k using the structure of the payoffs. Suppose that this is trueD. Bergemann, S. Morris / Games and Economic Behavior 71 (2011) 261–281 281
for k. Then for any mi ∈ S∗
i (θi) ⊆ Sk
i (θi),t h e r ee x i s t smj ∈ S∗
j(θj) ⊆ Sk
j(θj) such that g(mi,mj) = f(θi,θj). Thus there does
not exist νi ∈  (Mi) such that
 
m 
i
νi
 
m 
i
 
ui
 
g
 
m 
i,mj
 
,(θi,θj)
 
> ui
 
g(mi,mj),(θi,θj)
 
= 3,
and so mi ∈ S
k+1
i (θi).
Thus we must have that (m1,m2) ∈ S∗
1(θ1)× S∗
2(θ2) implies g(m1,m2) = f(θ1,θ 2).L e tm∗
i (·) be any selection from S∗
i (·).
Now let k∗ be the lowest k such that, for some i,
m∗
i
 
θ 
i
 
/ ∈ S
k
i (θi).
Without loss of generality, let i = 1. Note m∗
2(θ 
2) ∈ Sk
2(θ2) for all k < k∗ by deﬁnition of k∗. If agent 1 was type θ1 and was
sure his opponent were type θ2 and choosing action m∗
2(θ 
2), we know that he could guarantee himself a payoff of 1 by
choosing m∗
1(θ 
1).S i n c em∗
1(θ 
1) is deleted for type θ1 at round k∗, we know that there exists ν1 ∈  (M1) such that:
 
m 
1
ν1
 
m 
1
 
g1
 
m 
1,m∗
2
 
θ 
2
  
> 1,
and thus there exists m 
1 such that g1(m 
1,m∗
2(θ 
2)) = f(θ1,θ 2). This implies that m∗
2(θ 
2) ∈ S∗
2(θ2), a contradiction.
The example uses the fact that the social choice function always selects an outcome that is strictly Pareto-optimal
and – paradoxically – it is this feature which inhibits rationalizable implementation in the current example. Börgers (1995)
proves the impossibility of complete information implementation of non-dictatorial social choice functions in iteratively
undominated strategies when the set of feasible preference proﬁles includes such unanimous preference proﬁles and the
argument here is reminiscent of Börgers’ argument.
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